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Fiscal reform has been in the forefront of India's economic reform programme initiated in 1991. That the fiscal situation prevailing at the end of the 1980s marked by large and persistent deficits in the government budgets needed strong corrective action was recognized on all hands well before the onset of the balance of payments crisis that compelled the country to seek the assistance of the IMF and the World Bank to keep the economy going. The Prime, Minister's Economic Advisory Council chaired by the late Sukhamoy Chakravarty had in their report of December 1989 drawn pointed attention to the uncertainties posed by the twin imbalances that had been plaguing the Indian economy at the time despite notable acceleration in output growth during the decade, one on the fiscal side and the other in external trade (Economic Advisory Council, 1989) . While the reforms launched to combat the crisis that came to a head in 1991 sought to correct the imbalances through measures mounted on several fronts, the focus was on fiscal reform as the key to stabilization and growth on a sustainable basis. The deficits in the government budget were seen as a prime source of imbalance on the external front too as they were thought to spill into the balance of payments and raise questions about the country's solvency at home and abroad.
Among the first tasks that the then Finance Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, set for himself to restore the macrobalance of the economy was to reduce the fiscal deficit of the central government which was then running at over 8 per cent of GDP, to no more than 5 per cent within three or four years. The first two years of reform saw the centre's fiscal deficit coming down to less than 6 per cent. After a relapse in the third year -1993-94 -the deficit level came down again but remained stubbornly at about 6 per cent during the next two years. It was only in 1996-97 that the centre's gross fiscal deficit (GFD) as a proportion of GDP fell to 5 per cent.* 1 To honor the commitment of the United
Front that came to power subsequently towards further compression of the fiscal deficit, the Finance Minister Mr Chidambaram set a target of 4.5 per cent for the year 1997-98. Going by the present indications, the target is unlikely to be met, the bumper yield of the VDIS notwithstanding. The draft Ninth Plan just released* 2 envisages a fiscal deficit of no more than 3.5 per cent at the centre in the terminal year, that is 2002-03. Some even suggest that in order to make sure that the government "lives within its means" there should be a statutory ceiling on the borrowing it can resort to in a year.* 3 What should be the precise level of deficit in a given situation does not admit of a straightforward answer. The proposition that fiscal deficits automatically spill into balance of payments is open to question as it proceeds on a simplistic reading of a national income identity and takes no account of the impact of policy measures on the crucial variables that bear on the macro-balances of the economy or the behavioral reactions of the economic agents (Balakrishnan, 1997) . Besides, what matters in determining the impact of budgetary operations on aggregate demand and macro-economic outcomes, it may be argued, is the composition of the expenditures of the government and the methods of financing them rather than the magnitude of the fiscal deficit (Rakshit, 1991) . Limiting the level of borrowing by laying down statutory caps does not quite work, and, as the US experience shows, can give rise to intractable questions like what should be the relevant measure of the deficit,* 4 and even generate disputes calling for intervention by the courts (Bagchi, 1991) . However, there can be no gainsaying that, beyond a point, financing of budget deficits by borrowing cannot be sustained. Heavy reliance on borrowing by the government year after year pushes up interest rates and the interest burden on the budget, pre-empting a large chunk of the revenue, retarding private investment and piling up a burden for the future, and tends to lead the country towards insolvency. Financing by money printing also has its limits.* 5 In any case, it is generally accepted that the pattern of financing government expenditures that had emerged in India during the 70s and 80s, depending heavily on borrowing, was simply not sustainable and needed strong corrective action. Without going into the question what precisely could be the safe level of fiscal deficit in the Indian context, this paper seeks to provide an overview of the direction of fiscal reforms that have taken place in the Indian economy in recent years and the tasks ahead in the light of a few signposts.
The conclusion briefly is that while the reforms have yielded some tangible results in terms of stabilization, the fiscal situation remains fragile. The quality of consolidation on the fiscal front leaves much to be desired. The imbalances remain latent and can resurface any time unless the fundamental problems that affect the finances of the public sector are frontally addressed.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives the highlights of the reforms and their deficiencies, section 3 tries to identify the tasks ahead and the roadblocks, and section 4 concludes.
Fiscal Consolidation So Far: Achieve ments and Weaknesses Deficit

Reduction: Some Indicators
That some serious effort has been made to narrow the gap between revenue and expenditures of the government as a major goal of the reforms at least at the centre cannot perhaps be disputed. Going by the average of the three years 1994-95 to 1996-97, the GFD of the centre following the reforms has been less than 6 per cent as against 8.2 per cent in the latter half of the 80s (Table 1) . Even if the deficit in the current financial year (1997-98) fails to meet the target of 4.5 per cent and ends up with 5 per cent, it is a vast improvement from the situation prevailing at the time the reforms were launched. Total outstanding liabilities of the government as a proportion of GDP have also registered a significant decrease, from 65.2 1980 -81 to 1984 -85 1985 -86 to 1989 -90 1990 -91 1991 -92 1992 -93 1993 -94 1994 -95 1995 -96 1996 -97 1997 1996 -97 (RBI, 1997a . This, it has been argued, may not be enough. Keeping in view the parameters governing macro-stability of the economy and also the deficits of the states, a rough target for the central government's fiscal deficit, it is suggested, might be 4 per cent (Joshi and Little, 1996) .
However, as briefly noted at the outset, the sustainability of budget deficits depends on a number of other factors and not merely on their size. Theoretical literature on the subject suggests that debt-GDP ratio tends to grow explosively if the government continuously runs a non-interest ('primary') deficit larger than what it can obtain through money-printing ('seignorage') and if the real interest rate at which it borrows exceeds the rate of growth of the economy.* 6 Through the 80s, the central government in India was running a primary deficit of over 4 per cent of GDP annually and the interest rates corrected for inflation also often tended to exceed the growth rate of output. With the debt-GDP ratio exceeding 60 per cent, it was imperative for preserving the country's solvency to reduce the level of primary deficit to no more than what could be covered safely (that is, without sparking inflationary expectations) by seignorage. According to estimates of Joshi and Little (1996) , the primary deficit should not go beyond 1.3 per cent in the coming years.
As Table 1 would show, although the fiscal deficits of the centre still appear to be higher than what is widely regarded as desirable, primary deficits have registered a sharp decline. From an average of 4.8 per cent of GDP in the latter half of the 80s, the level of primary deficit came down to 1.6 per cent in the very first year of reform and was no more than 0.4 per cent in 1996-97, according to revised budget estimates. The budget for 1997-98 aimed to eliminate the primary deficit altogether and instead generate a surplus of Rs 2546 crore, which, as a ratio of the expected GDP growth works out to 0.2 per cent. This target may not materialize. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the reforms have served to compress the primary deficit considerably, signifying a determined attempt to bring the centre's budget on an even keel.
Another remarkable stride towards fiscal discipline has been the agreement between the central government and the Reserve Bank of India. (RBI) signed in September 1994 whereby the long-standing practice of financing government's budget needs, which cannot be met otherwise, by borrowing from the RBI against ad hoc treasury bills has been dis continued in a phased manner over a three-year period ending 1997-98. By ruling out any direct or automatic monetization of budget deficits, this measure, it is hoped, would help to strengthen the efficacy of monetary management by the RBI and remove a major source of instability in the economy. Thanks partly to these measures and the prudent monetary policy followed by the RBI, Indian economy has seen some relative stability in prices as well as on the external front. There are, however, several points of weaknesses in the fiscal scene which critics feel can undo what has been achieved unless attended to in time. In the paragraphs that follow, an attempt is made to identify some of the major deficiencies alongside the notable achievements.
Deficiencies
• While there has been an appreciable compression of the fiscal deficit of the government at the centre, the states continue to run sizeable deficits in their budgets and so the overall fiscal scenario continues to cause concern. Taking the budgets of the states into account, the consolidated fiscal deficit of the government (centre and states combined) remains pretty high, at over 8 per cent of GDP. This is no doubt lower than the 10 per cent that prevailed during the closing years of the 80s. It cannot still be considered comfortable.
• With a large public sector operating outside the government budgets and relying heavily on borrowing to meet their requirements, for a proper assessment of the impact of the government sector's claim on the resources of the economy, one has to take into account not only the budgets of the governments as such but also of the entire public sector, including the public sector undertakings, departmental and nondepartmental. For this purpose, what is relevant is a measure of the total Public Sector Borrowing Requirements (PSBR), defined as the excess of expenditure over r evenue of all government entities, financed by new borrowing net of repayments of past debts.* 7 While there are alternative approaches to this measure, the simplest is the one based on the 'public debt' criterion, namely, the difference between total public debt outstanding at the beginning of the year and that at the end of the year. Because of paucity of data, it has not been possible to attempt such a measurement for India so far (RBI, 1997b) . One may argue that for a fuller picture of the state of public finances, it is necessary to also take into account the contingent liabilities such as are inherent in the guarantees and counter-guarantees given by the government. A balance sheet of the public sector with all the information relevant for assessing the fiscal health of the economy is yet to be drawn up. Until then, it is difficult to make any definitive judgement about the adequacy of the fiscal correction in the process of reform.
So far as primary deficit is concerned, although there has been marked progress towards prudence, a recent study avers that solvency is not assured. If the objective of stabilizing the debt-GDP ratio is to be achieved, the study concludes that further fiscal retrenchment in order to secure a primary surplus by the public sector of the order of four and a half per cent of GDP will be needed (Buiter and Patel, 1997) .
Such an outcome remains a distant goal.
A disturbing feature of the current fiscal scene is the persistence of large deficits on the current or revenue budgets of the government (commonly called 'revenue deficit'). As may be seen from Table 1 , revenue deficit of the centre, that is the excess of revenue expenditure over revenue receipts, which happened to be no more than 0.6 per cent of the GDP in the early 80s (earlier the revenue budgets even produced surpluses), shot up to 3.5 per cent in the second half. With the reforms, the revenue deficit has come down but still reigns at more than 2 per cent of GDP. On the states' side, although the amount of borrowing they can incur is subject to limits operated by the RBI, budgets of most states now show a revenue deficit, and the combined deficit in their revenue budget forms about 1 per cent of GDP at present, and their GFD is of the order of 3 per cent. The implication of revenue deficits is too obvious to need elaboration. When borrowings are used to meet unproductive current expenditures instead of being employed in channels that can yield tangible returns to the exchequer, debt servicing gets increasingly difficult leading inexorably to what is called a debt trap and detracting from the government's ability to discharge its responsibilities in vital areas like health, education, and maintenance of assets like roads.
While the central budget clearly bears the imprint of fiscal correction in terms of overall deficit reduction, the reforms have affected the composition of expenditures in a way that is scarcely conducive to growth and welfare. With revenues down by more than 1 per cent of GDP, reduction in the fiscal deficit in the centre's budget during the reforms has come from compression of aggregate expenditures of the order of 4.5 per cent of GDP. The major share of the contraction, viz., 3 per cent out of the said 4.5 per cent has occurred in capital expenditures, the revenue budget contributing the remaining 1.5 percentage point ( Table 2) . Growth of revenue expenditure no doubt decelerated with the reforms from 16.8 per cent to 14.2 per cent per annum but the slowdown in capital spending which was already sagging has been more pronounced, from 10.3 to 8.6 per cent (Table 3 ).
In the case of the states, capital expenditure as a proportion of GDP had gone down sharply even before the reforms from 5.8 in the first half of the 80s to 3.6 per cent in the second half. The proportion underwent a further decline during the reform period and stood at 2.8 per cent in 1996-97 (Table 2) . • Taking the expenditures of the centre and the states together, budget compression has impacted adversely the sectors that bear vitally on the welfare of the people and the development potential of the economy, such as, education, health, roads, industry and minerals, agriculture, power, irrigation and flood control, and public works with only a small increase in the allocation to poverty alleviation. Before the reforms (as of 1989-90) government spending (centre and states combined) on these sectors formed about 11.3 per cent of GDP; in 1995-96, the proportion was 9.6 per cent (Table 4) . Revised estimates for 1996-97 suggest that there has been only marginal increase in the level in the last two years.
• The biggest loser in the process of fiscal adjustment has been the central government's capital expenditure under the Eighth Plan. Non-Plan revenue expenditures under the Plan have remained practically at the same level and, in fact, have gone up albeit slightly (Table 2) . Contrary to what was envisaged for the role of fiscal policy when the country embarked on state-led planning for development, viz., generating surpluses for financing investment in the public sector, the current revenues of the government are now unable to meet even the revenue expenditures. This poses an acute dilemma for planning. While under the new economic paradigm, thinking about the role of planning is undergoing a radical change, it is nevertheless acknowledged that investment in several critically important sectors of the economy such as power and roads has to be undertaken largely by the state, and so there has to be a major step up in the capital expenditure for development, presumably under some form of planning. The expectation that the public sector would be able to undertake this task with extra-budgetary resources like their own surpluses and borrowings has not been fulfilled. Data source: See Table 1 . appears, there have been gaping shortfalls in capacity creation in power and other vital areas during the Eighth Plan period. While indecision and red tape must share part of the blame, basically it is paucity of the funds in the public sector that stood in the way. Substantial contribution from the government's budgets is imperative for stepping up investment in vital sectors of the economy. With the present trends in revenue and expenditure growth, this is not going to be easy especially in view of the a dditional burden on the revenue budgets of both the centre and the states, in the wake of pay revision of government employees following the Fifth Pay Commission's recommendations.
• Reform of the tax structure has formed an important component of the fiscal reform agenda. The tax system that had evolved in India in the post-independence era was marked by a preponderance of indirect taxes and dwindling significance of taxes on income and capital. The indirect taxes which accounted for roughly 85 per cent of the government revenue (centre and states combined) were made up mainly of customs and excises at the central level and sales taxes in the states.
With the liberalization and opening up of the economy, the tax structure needed to be reformed to orient it to the new environment by lessening the de- Chelliah et al. (1997) .
Vikalpa
pendence on customs and turning more to taxes on income and domestic trade. It was also necessary to remove the elements in the tax system that throttled competition and caused distortion in resource useand such elements were many -with taxes levied on all commodities including producer goods at different levels of government with little coordination. How complex and distortionary the domestic trade taxes system had been is depicted in a study carried out at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP,1994) and is not gone into here. The revenue productivity of the taxes also needed strengthening in order that fiscal adjustment could take place without much compression of essential government expenditures.
Based on the blueprint chalked out by the Tax Reforms Committee (the Chelliah Committee), the central government carried out extensive reform of its tax structure in the course of 1991-92 and thereafter. The guiding principle was drastic lowering and rationalization of the rates of both direct as well as indirect taxes, and widening of the base. The maximum marginal rate of income tax on both personal and corporate income has been brought down successively to 30 per cent and 35 per cent respectively from over 40 per cent and 50 per cent earlier. Dividends have been freed of taxation in the hands of shareholders and several other measures taken to simplify the income tax system. On the indirect taxes side, the peak rate of custom duty has been reduced from 300 per cent to 40 per cent now. The spread and multiplicity of rates of union excise have also been reduced and the value added tax (VAT) principle extended to cover virtually the entire range of industrial production through the MODVAT credit system. New ground has been broken with the levy of service tax on selected items by the central government. These reforms have succeeded in bringing about a significant shift in the tax structure. The share of direct taxes in the gross tax revenue of the centre has gone up from 19.2 per cent in 1990-91 to over 30 per cent at present. Correspondingly, the share of indirect taxes has registered a decline from 80.8 per cent in 1990-91 to 69.7 per cent in 1996-97 (Table 5) . Both corporation tax and personal income tax revenue displayed unprecedented growth (over 22 per cent per annum). Nevertheless, there was a decline in the level of taxation as measured by the tax-GDP ratio. The proportion of centre's gross tax revenue to GDP which had gone up to 11.3 per cent in 1987-88 and 1989-90 came down to 9.4 per cent in 1993-94. The ratio has registered some recovery since then. But, as of 1996-97. it stood at 10.4 per cent (Table 6 ). The ground lost primarily because of the sharp decline in the growth of indirect taxes, particularly customs, i s thus yet to be retrieved.
The union budgets for 1996-97 and 1997-98 saw some innovative measures combined with further reduction in rates of income tax. Notable among these was the introduction of a Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) on companies, an estimated income scheme for small businesses and levy of excise duty on certain items presumptively on the basis of their production capacity. To widen the coverage of income tax, filing of tax returns has been made obligatory based on certain economic criteria such as ownership of motor vehicles, house property, foreign travel, and subscription of a telephone line. These base widening efforts were, however, somewhat undermined by generous tax concessions for investment in certain areas like infrastructure. Some relaxations were granted in the scheme of MAT too and a voluntary disclosure of income scheme (VDIS) was launched Vikalpa in 1997 to mop up tax on unaccounted incomes in a big way. The yield of VDIS exceeded Rs 10,000 crore surpassing all expectations. But the impact of the measure so far on the tax culture of the country and medium-term buoyancy of tax revenues remains to be seen. As yet, there is no clear evidence of any substantial improvement in the revenue generating capacity of the centre's indirect taxes system either.
Tax reforms on the states' side were focused mainly on the sales tax, which by all account were marked by acute complexities. The aim was to install a system of destination-principle VAT replacing the multiplicity of levies and shifting the burden of taxation from production to consumption. Based on the study conducted at the NIPFP in 1994 referred to above, states have been contemplating reform of their sales tax and moving towards a system of VAT. A model VAT law is under preparation at the NIPFP. However, a truly harmonized destination-based VAT is yet to take shape. Meanwhile, the ratio of taxes raised by the states on their own to GDP has remained more or less stagnant at around 5.8 per cent with the buoyancy of tax revenue going down in the first half of the 90s (Table 7) . Reflecting this reality the overall tax ratio (centre and states combined) slipped from 17 per cent to 15 per cent in 1993-94 following the reforms and now stands at 16 per cent (Table 6 ).
• The decline in the tax ratio in India runs contrary to the experience of tax reform in major countries especially in Latin America. Reforms carried out in these countries in the 80s and early 90s saw an increase in tax-GDP ratio by 2-4 per cent of GDP within a span of 4-5 years (Planning Commission Working Group, 1997) . The growth rate of tax revenue which slipped behind the GDP growth in the second half of the 80s must overcome its sluggishness if the tax-GDP ratio is to go up. For that, attention needs to be focused equally on taxes at the central and the state level.
The picture that emerges from the preceding review broadly is, fiscal reform has succeeded in reducing the fiscal and primary deficits of the central government appreciably, and the revenue deficits have also come down but the gap in the revenue budget persists. Reforms have had a markedly restraining impact on the growth of government expenditures but the contraction has been more in capital rather than revenue expenditures. Even making allowance for the fact that a good part of the spending under the current or revenue budgets is also of the developmental category and is often comprised under the 'Plan' -and that has not contracted -the slowdown in capital spending by the government has affected the build up of capacity in vital infrastructure sectors, like power and roads. If the state is to play its role in development, scope for further contraction of government expenditures seems limited. This is not to deny that many government departments and public sector units are still overstaffed and can benefit from pruning and exercising economy in expenditure. Nevertheless, as Musgrave (1997) warns, downsizing the government at any cost makes no sense. Hence, the focus of further reforms in the fiscal arena must be to raise the level of budget allocation to the vital social sectors, viz., health and education and also the infrastructure sectors of power, roads, and irrigation. At the same time, care has to be taken to see that the norms of fiscal prudence are adhered to. All this implies that government expenditures need to be restructured and may even have to be raised while lowering the level of borrowing, which, in turn, calls for augmenting the government's revenues very substantially. Every possibility of achieving economy and efficiency on the expenditure side must also be explored.
Tasks Ahead
Broad calculations show that if the level of capital outlay of the centre under the Plans is to be restored to near about its early 80s level (say 4 per cent of GDP), without impinging too much on revenue expenditures, that would mean raising the centre's aggregate expenditures to 18 per cent of GDP from the present 15.8 per cent level. If GFD is not to exceed 4 per cent of GDP, the revenue receipts would have to go up to 14 per cent of GDP from 10.2 per cent that is prevailing now, that is, by nearly 4 percentage points. This obviously is not feasible through taxation alone and so attention must turn to contacting nondevelopmental revenue expenditures and augmenting nontax revenues.
The scope for curtailing revenue expenditures does not seem to be too promising especially with the burden of pay revision pre-empting about 0.5 per cent of GDP.* 8 The only major item that can take some cut is interest payments. Going against the trend in aggregate expenditure, the proportion of interest payments in the centre's budget went up from 3.4 per cent of GDP in the late 80s to 4.5 per cent during the reform period (Table  2A) . With the reduction of the debt-ratio and a softening of the rates, the interest burden on the government budgets is likely to abate. There are some encouraging signs in this direction but much will depend on the progress of disinvestment, the level of domestic savings, and the compulsions of exchange rate management. While domestic savings have moved up, disinvestment has been encountering obstacles. The explicit subsidies, one of the other major items of centre's revenue expenditure, have been contained appreciably and can take a further cut of at the most 0.3 to 0.4 per cent of GDP. The onus of raising resources for productive expenditure and investment, therefore, will thus rest primarily on tax revenue and nontax revenue, the two potential avenues, the latter bringing better returns from public sector enterprises and roll-back of implicit subsidies. It may also be possible to impart a clearer thrust towards welfare and growth in government spending with only a modest increase in the level of aggregate expenditure with only some restructuring. We first turn to consider to what extent and how this can be achieved.
Expenditure Restructuring
A framework for restructuring public expenditure over a seven year period (1995-96 to 2002-03 ) drawn up at the NIPFP by a team led by Prof Raja Chelliah suggests that if certain stipulated physical targets such as near universal primary education and primary health care and acceptable standards of road maintenance are to be met, the share of the three sectors, viz., education, health, and roads, in total government expenditure (capital and revenue, taking the centre and the states together) will need to be raised from the present 17.9 per cent to 27.3 per cent by 2002-03. In terms of ratio to GDP, the expenditure under those heads would have to be raised from 4.8 per cent to 7.5 per cent. If the level of total expenditure is to be kept within what would be available with revenue receipts plus borrowing not exceeding 3.5 per cent of GDP, the share of the other sectors in total expenditure would have to come down from 82 per cent to 72.7 per cent (as a proportion of GDP, from 22.1 per cent to 19.9 per cent). The projection envisages that the total expenditure to GDP ratio would rise from 26.9 per cent to 27.4 per cent (Table 4 ). This will require raising the revenue ratio by 4 percentage of GDP over the 1994-95 base which broadly accords with the targets put forward in the preceding two paragraphs, although the approach here lays some emphasis on the capital expenditures too in the government budget. Of this, one percentage point will be contributed by the states by raising their tax ratio and the rest by the centre. The centre's tax ratio is projected to go up to 11.5 per cent over the seven year period (from 10.2 per cent of GDP in the base year to 11.5 per cent) relying primarily on direct taxes. The balance would have to come out of non-tax revenues. The framework makes detailed suggestions about the directions in which efforts might be mounted to raise the revenue ratio, particularly the direct tax ratio (vide Chelliah et al., 1997) . The draft Ninth Five Year Plan drawn up by the Planning Commission also envisages the centre's tax ratio to go up to 11.5 per cent in the terminal year . Going by current trends this is not going to be simple. Projections based on the assumption of a nominal GDP growth of 13 per cent per annum show that a rise in the tax ratio of the order contemplated (that is, from 10.4 per cent to 11.5 per cent) will require raising the buoyancy of the central taxes from the present 0.91 to 1.2 over the five years beginning 1997-98. Since it is not possible to fall back on customs to augment revenues, the burden will have to be borne by income tax and excises (Table 8) .
Measures to
Step up the Tax Ratio: Income Tax Discussions about how to raise the tax ratio in India turn, quite understandably, towards income tax. This is because the ratio of income tax to GDP at present (about 3 per cent) happens to be lower than the level obtaining in comparable developing countries and the proportion of individuals paying income tax is a minuscule 1.5 per cent of the population. Evasion too Collections from income tax during the fiscal year that is about to end have received an unexpected boost from the yield of the VDIS. The resounding success of the scheme has generated optimism that the culture of tax compliance in the country has undergone a sea change and one can look forward to a radically new tax structure in India with income tax as the principal source of tax revenue like in advanced countries. As noted earlier, the current fiscal year has seen several measures to widen the tax net. Significant steps have also been taken to strengthen the information system in the tax department with allocation of permanent account number to tax payers, computerization, and better facilities for tax collectors. While the campaign to widen the tax base is commendable, and in fact was long overdue, for several reasons, particularly, low per capita incomes, preponderance of the unorganized sector and exclusion of agricultural income from the tax base, income tax cannot possibly displace the indirect taxes as the principal revenue earner of the government in the near future.
With the low proportion of employment in the organized sector (less than 10 per cent as against 80-90 per cent in advanced countries) it would perhaps be unrealistic to expect the population coverage of income tax in India to reach the level of countries in the West. Even if the efforts show some impressive results, enlargement of the income tax base in terms of number of assesses alone may not help much in raising the revenue ratio. Deepening, with better compliance by large income earners, more than widening of the population coverage is what is needed to improve the contribution of income tax to the exchequer and that depends on the efficacy of the administration in enforcing the tax laws. It would be futile to expect a sea change to come about in compliance unless t here is an efficient administrative and judicial system to lend credibility to the sanctions provided in the law against evasion. That will call for some radical reform in areas that have gone untouched so far, viz., judicial procedures and an overhaul of administrative organization and methods. Better compliance requires sustained efforts in several directions and then there are no quick fixes.
Hence, realistically, income tax collections cannot be expected to grow at the rate that was witnessed in the last five years even though it can perhaps contribute a further 0.5 per cent in the tax-GDP ratio, if the efforts towards better enforcement are not undermined by narrowing of the tax base through incentives or too many concessions to tax payers by way of higher exemption limits and so on. Although the professed thrust of the recent tax reforms has been towards a regime of moderate rates and wider base, there has been some reversal of the trend towards base broadening with the introduction of several provisions promising tax breaks for investment in specified areas like infrastructure. Increasing globalization and the growth of electronic commerce, thanks to the rapid extension of the use of the internet are posing challenges for tax administrators all over the world in protecting national tax bases (Asher, 1997) . India too will have to grapple with these developments in the coming years. Given this hard reality, income tax revenue is unlikely to retain the momentum it had acquired in the reform period, and so the burden of raising the tax ratio of the centre will rest partly, if not mainly, on indirect taxes, principally the taxes on consumption and trade.
Indirect Taxes
Customs: The immediate impact of the tax reforms was a sharp deceleration in the revenue from customs, from 16.6 per cent per annum during the second half of the 80s to just 3 per cent in the first three years of reform. There was a pick-up in the subsequent three years and the annual average growth rate between 1990-91 and 1996-97 works out to 13.2 per cent. The budget projection for 1997-98 assumes a growth of 19 per cent but this is unlikely to come about. From reports so far, it appears, because of falling imports, customs revenues are sagging this year. Even if import growth improves, with the tariffs slated for further reduction, customs should not be expected to grow faster in the future than in the recent past. Customs, in any case, is not a stable revenue source being subject to the vagaries of world trade and the trend all over the world has been to reduce the dependence on customs as a revenue generator.
Union Excise: Excise revenue remained depressed even with fairly good industrial performance in 1996-97. Possible reasons are: leakage through the operation of MODVAT, set off of duties paid on capital goods and as the Tax Policy Working Group suggests, inadequate adjustment of the duty rates on final products following the extension of MODVAT credit to cover practically all inputs including capital goods (Planning Commission Tax Policy Working Group, 1997) . There are some fundamental reasons as well.
Excise duty being a tax on 'manufacturing' suffers from some inherent problems which erode its revenue buoyancy. Principally, these are difficulties associated with defining 'manufacturing' and determination of excisable value of manufactures. These problems are compounded by the exclusion of services from the tax base. By virtue of the terms of the relevant entry in the Union List, the base of excise duty is confined only to the production or manufacturer of goods without any reference to services. In order to get over the problems of valuation, the TRC had recommended that the excise net be extended to the wholesale stage, while allowing the states to administer the tax on the value added by wholesalers and retain the revenue. The suggestion has not found favour because of practical reasons as also the possibility of inter-state tussle over the revenue attributable to taxation of wholesale transactions (NIPFP, 1994) . The fact of the matter is that taxation at the manufacturing level is not sustainable. Finding these problems intractable, Canada has replaced its Manufacturers' Sales Tax (MST) with a federal level value added tax in 1991 called the Goods and Services Tax (GST).
With our present constitutional framework, it does not seem possible to move in the direction of a Canada-type GST although there is a good case for rethinking on the assignment of tax powers in the Indian federation (Bagchi, 1997a) . For the present, reforms in India have to settle for an imperfect system whereby a manufacturers' VAT is levied by the centre and sales tax is levied by the states. Revenue productivity of excises could, however, be enhanced if exemptions which are still substantial were removed. Improvement in administration can also yield good dividend, as evasion in excises is still believed to be large, and operation of MODVAT monitored more effectively through an efficient information system using a unique taxpayer identification number and not by shortsighted measures such as denying MODVAT credit which is legitimately due to taxpayers, as seems to be going on in some collectorates, according to newspaper reports.
Tax on Services
One way of augmenting the tax revenues in India is to bring services under the tax net. By invoking the residuary powers under the constitution, the centre has started levying tax on services selectively, beginning with only three items, viz. telephones, non-life insurance, and the services of share brokers. The service tax has since been extended to a few other items, such as transport of goods by road, consulting engineers, clearing agents, air-travel agents, outdoor caterers, and manpower recruiting agencies. While the widening of the tax base is to be welcomed, the right way to bring services under taxation would have been to integrate it with a system of VAT as, otherwise, the tax can cause cascading, e.g., when levied on road transport operators. Besides, many of the services are provided at the retail level, e.g., outdoor catering, and are better administered by the states. Only those services which form an integral part of manufacturing or which have all Indian ramification, e.g., air-travel, should be taxed by the centre. Inclusion of services on a selective basis for central taxation cannot possibly make up for the deficiencies of tax on manufacturing stemming from the inherent problems mentioned above.
It would thus appear that the room for raising the centre's tax ratio by more than one percentage point is rather limited unless there is quantum leap in enforcement. A part of the burden for raising the level of taxation in the country, therefore, has to be shared by the states.
Sales Tax
Although the states' manoeuvrability in the tax field is circumscribed by constitutional limitations, reforms coupled with administration upgradation can help to lift the level of states' taxation significantly.
The main focus of the states' tax reform has to be on the sales taxes which contribute over 60 per cent of tax revenue from. their own sources. Moreover, because of their importance in the panoply of commodity taxes in the country, it was realized that tax reform in India would not be complete unless the sales taxes levied by the states were thoroughly overhauled and replaced by a system of VAT with an agreement among the states not to engage in debilitating tax exporting and tax competition. Based on a scheme suggested in NIPFP (1994), reform of sales taxes by moving over to a system of VAT has been under contemplation in several states. Progress, however, has been rather slow, fear of revenue loss being a major inhibitory factor. Only Maharashtra seems to have gone ahead to transform its sales taxes into a VAT by suitably amending its sales tax law. While efforts are on to evolve a uniform pattern of VAT in the country, it would be difficult to persuade all states to agree to a radical change in their sales tax systems unless they are assured of protection against revenue loss. For that, the centre can help by holding out assurance of an adjustment assistance grant as in Canada. The state's tax revenues would also gain if the tax rental arrangement whereby the centre levies additional excise duty in lieu of sales tax on textiles, tobacco, and sugar was abrogated and the powers of the states to levy sales tax thereon restored.
Reform of domestic trade taxes will not meet the objective of economic neutrality unless the present practice of taxing inter-state sales on origin basis via the Central Sales Tax is abjured and a destination type VAT is brought into operation. There has been little progress in this direction even though a committee was constituted in 1995-96 to see how best that issue could be resolved and the matter has acquired some urgency in view of the commitment to remove tariff barriers to trade in the SAARC region. Reform of commodity taxes has thus encountered roadblocks and further progress will call for more concerted effort to overcome them and creation of appropriate institutions for inter-state consultation and enforcing their decisions. That presupposes adequate preparation and public education on why the reforms are needed and their likely impact.
The states may use some of their other tax powers as well more fruitfully, especially the taxes on lands and buildings both in the urban as well as rural areas. Land revenue which provides a good instrument of taxing agricultural lands has virtually fallen into disuse. With the constitutional recognition of panchayats, it should be possible to revive the use of this tax under t he encouragement and guidance of the state governments. Real estates have appreciated phenomenally in value in most Indian cities and constitute a vast pool of taxable resource. Property taxation (PT) in India has got into doldrums because of entanglement with rent control laws on the one hand and administrative weakness coupled with judicial delays on the other. Here again, improvement would call for a determined effort to free the PT system from the shackles of rent control and reform the base of the PT in a new direction (Bagchi, 1997b) .
Non-Tax Revenue
Given the constraints in meeting the requirements of enhanced public expenditure on infrastructure and social sectors, it will not be wise to rely on taxation alone to bridge the fiscal gap, while attention needs to be paid to the non-tax revenue sources, especially the return on investments in public sector enterprises (PSEs) and recovery of user charges for public services.
One of the prime factors underlying the fiscal crisis of the Indian economy has been the poor financial performance of PSEs. Instead of turning out surpluses, many of them have been in the red for years and depended on budgetary support to meet their losses. A striking outcome of the reforms has been to contract the support to PSEs from the central budget. Disinvestment of certain portion of the government's interest in some of the enterprises has been u nder way and a Disinvestment Commission has been set up to advise the government in the matter. Progress, however, has not been encouraging. In fact, one of the weak spots of the reforms having a profound bearing on the fiscal health of the economy has been the failure to reform the working of the PSEs. Reforms are under way for efficient management of PSEs in the states too, a notable example being the reorganization of the State Electricity Board in Orissa and the creation of an electricity regulatory commission. The commission has restructured electricity tariffs both residential and agricultural to reduce cross subsidization. Similar reforms seem to be under contemplation in Haryana and Rajasthan. But, these are rather isolated instances instead of heralding a general trend.
Subsidies are provided by the government in India in various forms, only some of them routed explicitly through the budget. Over time, subsidies given in the form of free or underpriced public services have assumed larger proportion than the explicit ones. Many of these come within the category of 'non-merit' goods. As of 1994-95, taking the centre and the states together, aggregate subsidies on nonmerit social and economic services worked out to nearly 11 per cent of GDP. The all-India cost recovery rate for even non-merit services was no more than 3.5 per cent of social services and 11.2 per cent for economic services. Much of the benefits of these services flow to sections of the community who cannot be regarded as needy. Evidently, there is good scope for reducing the fiscal deficit simply by scaling down the subsidies (Srivastava and Sen, 1997) . Even a 20 per cent cost recovery for non-merit goods could reduce the fiscal deficit of the centre by about Rs 5000 crore in 1994-95. There has been a perceptible reduction in the explicit subsidies given through the central budget during the reforms -from 2.3 per cent of GDP in 1989-90 to 1.3 per cent in 1996-97. But, the implicit subsidies which constitute the bulk remain virtually untouched. Subsides provided by the State Electricity Boards to agriculture and domestic sectors in 1996-97 came to Rs 19200 crore, marking a big leap from Rs 5651 crore in 1990-91 (Planning Commission, 1997). There are manv other areas where there are large implicit subsidies eating into the vitals of government finances in the country. However, this is a matter on which reform cannot possibly succeed without a political initiative and strong backing of public opinion.
Economy in Government Expenditure
Government budgets can be toned up significantly with some attention to methods and institutions that reward economy and efficiency in the use of public funds. Public expenditure management has not received the attention it deserves in India.
While there has been much discussion of the need for economy and efficient government expenditures and various devices like zero-base budgeting and performance budgeting have figured in seminars and conferences, waste in government expenditures remains endemic. To what extent incentives like giving some freedom to spending agencies to decide about the allocation of their expenditures can help can be seen from the move to reduce the armed forces by 50000. The celebrated success of New Zealand in containing government expenditure and the better utilization through devolution of powers and fixing accountability to the agencies involved (Scott, 1996) hold out important lessons for all countries like India suffering from proliferation of wasteful public expenditure.
The system of inter-governmental transfer that has been operating in India has been notoriously deficient in this regard. It is only recently that the Finance Commissions are looking at the baneful effects of the gap-filling approach that guided a good part of the statutory transfers from the centre to the states in the past. Looking at the state finances in India, the Tenth Finance Commission concluded that there has been a 'systemic' problem in the whole system. The problem persists, even with the correctives suggested by the Commission. The remedy lies possibly in some fundamental reforms in the system of federal transfers. The role of institutions and incentives in public expenditure management is yet to be duly appreciated in India (Bagchi, 1997c) .
Concluding Observations
The facts that stand out from a review of India's fiscal reforms so far may be summed up as follows. One, even after appreciable reduction, the deficits in the government budgets continue to remain large. Two, for stability and sustained growth of the economy at rates that could lift the country out of poverty within a reasonable period, the deficits need to be brought down, not so much by cutting down government expenditures in the aggregate as by restructuring them and raising the scale of spending on health, education, roads, and other infrastructure. Three, efforts on several fronts on the revenue as well as on expenditure side will be required to achieve this. Revenue augmentation will need a more determined thrust towards simpler tax structure with a comprehensive VAT covering both goods and services as the centrepiece, as well as improving the efficiency of the tax administration. Four, non-tax revenues offer good scope for augmentation through reform of the public sector and a thorough review of the subsidies. Finally, the institutional arrangements that have a vital bearing on the incentives for economy in government spending also need a fresh look drawing upon international experience and some new ones need to be created. None of these is, however, possible without bold political initiative and a national consensus on their urgency and need. Notes "'1 Gross fiscal deficit is the difference between aggregate disbursements of the government net of debt repayments and revenue receipts, recovery of loan and nondebt receipts.
*2 On 1 March 1998. *3 The Reserve Bank of India has been arguing for the imposition of such a ceiling from time to time. See, for instance, its Annual Reports for 1991-92, 1995-96 and 1996-97 . For an exposition of the rationale for the plea and the case for and against, see RBI Bulletin, 1997a. *4 In India's case, the question will be, should such a limit apply only to the internal and external debt of the government or the other liabilities comprising small savings, provident funds, etc. of the government as well or of the public sector as a whole?
'•5 For a lucid discussion of these issues see Fischer (1989) .
"'6 When the real interest rate is less than the real GDP growth rate, the debt-GDP ratio reaches a limit but if the ratio is already high, the country's solvency might come into question well before that limit is reached. As for external borrowing, it can be shown that the external debt to GDP grows without limit if real interest rate exceeds the real growth of exports (for an excellent exposition of these criteria, see Joshi and Little, 1994) .
*7 Because of statistical limitations, the computation of PSBR is usually restricted to the non-financial public sector and the public financial intermediaries are excluded. Some of the activities of the central bank and other public sector financial institutions, however, happen to be of a fiscal nature, e.g., providing subsidized loans, loan guarantees, and exchange rate guarantees and those give rise to implicit taxes and subsidies. Hence, for a transparent indicator of the public sector liabilities, one needs a measure of the state of the quasi-fiscal operations of public financial enterprises to assess 'the quasi-fiscal deficit' as well. Quantification of this concept, however, presents formidable difficulties and has so far not been attempted in measuring the PSBR (RBI, 1997). Rakshit (1991) sought to provide a rough approximation, in a tentative way.
*8 Roughly, Rs 10,000 crore will be required annually to meet the additional expenditure at the centre and double the amount in the states.
